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UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT*
ARCHIBALD COX ' *
I
One following the Supreme Court intimately cannot avoid being struck by
the very special nature of its work. There are many cases which might arise in
any court and which are not unusual except in their difficulty. More than half
the docket, however-and much the most important half-is quite unlike the
usual flow of litigation through State and inferior federal courts. In the United
States we have developed the extraordinary but perhaps very useful habit of
casting social, economic, philosophical and political questions in the form of
actions at law and suits in equity, and in this way a large proportion of the most
fundamental issues of our, times ultimately go before the Supreme Court for
judicial determination. They are issues upon which the community, consciously
or unconsciously, is deeply divided. They arouse the deepest emotions. Their
resolution-one way or the other-often writes our future history.
'2
1
The school segregation cases, the appeals from the conviction of "sit-ins,"
and the inevitable litigation over the "Freedom Riders" 3 furnish prime examples.
The lawsuits grow out of, and the decisions will profoundly influence, the conflict between the ideal of liberty and equality expressed in the Declaration of
Independence, on the one hand, and, on the other, a way of life rooted in the
customs of many of our people-North as well as South-since before the signing
of the Declaration. The cases cannot be decided wisely without recognizing the
underlying issue.
There are many other examples of my proposition. Some of the Court's hardest
cases during the past decade have emerged from the conflict between the pressures
for conformity and the need for individual freedom. 4 The Colorado River litigation will affect the growth of large areas in the Southwest.5 The decision in the
so-called Tennessee Reapportionment case, in which the Court will decide
whether the claim that gross malapportionment of representatives in both houses
of a State legislature violates the Fourteenth Amendment presents a justiciable
question, may write our governmental history for the next fifty years.6
* This article was originally delivered as a John Field Simms Lecture on February 8,
1962 at the University of New Mexico.
'* Solicitor General of the United States.
1. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1953) ;Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.

497 (1953).
2. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961); Briscoe v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157
(1961) ; Hoston v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
3. United States v. U. S. Klans, 194 F. Supp. 897 (M.D. Ala., 1961).
4. E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) ; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) ; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) ; American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
5. Arizona v. California, No. 8 Orig., October Term 1961.
6. Baker v. Carr, No. 6, October Term 1961.
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The nature of Supreme Court litigation enhances an antimony which lies at
the basis of the judicial process. The law is, in a sense, quite independent of, and
superior to, the courts which declare and apply it. As the late Judge Learned
Hand reminded usThe judge's authority and immunity depend upon the assumption that
he speaks with the mouth of others: the momentum of his utterances
must be greater than any which his personal reputation and character
can command, if it is to do the work assigned to it-if it is to stand
against the passionate resentments arising out of the interests he must
frustrate.
Yet judges make the law:
.. . the customary law of English-speaking people stands a structure
indubitably made by the hands of generations of judges . . .
The result is a dilemma both horns of which the judge must manage to escape. . . he must preserve his authority by cloaking himself in the majesty
of an overshadowing past; but he 7must discover some composition with
the dominant trends of his times.
Judge Hand was speaking of the growth of the common law. The dilemma is
sharper in constitutional law and the other branches of public law with which
the Supreme Court is predominantly concerned. The pressure to keep the law
in tune with the needs of men is stronger. Considerations of social and economic
policy lie closer to the surface. The words of the Constitution seldom control the
decision; they are binding, but such broad phrases as "due process of law" do not
provide answers to borderline cases. Likewise, there are few instances in which
Farrand's Debates or The Annals of Congress contribute anything useful to
constitutional exegesis, except a deeper understanding of our national traditions
and aspirations. All too often the Court must write upon a clean slate. And even
when a precedent is logically in point, the Court must ask whether changed
conditions may have sapped its vitality.8
The other branch of the antimony also presses more urgently. The grave
public importance and emotional content of the issues which the Supreme Court
decides make it even more important here than elsewhere that the Court's decisions summon a respect greater than mere men would command, if the Court
"is to do the work assigned to it-if it is to stand against the passionate resentments arising out of the interests [it] must frustrate." We would not long
tolerate a Council of Nine Wise Men charged with deciding our most difficult
and emotional questions according to their notion of what was just or wise or
politic; this is the function of representatives chosen by the people. The justices
7. Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 361 (1939).
8, Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 735 (1949).
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are charged with deciding according to law-a law which binds the judges no
less than the litigants, the governors no less than the governed-and part of the
"judicial merits" of any case-if I may use a barbarism-is the importance of
preserving this ancient ideal.
How does the Court resolve this dilemma of having to render decisions according to law even as it makes the law by which it is governed? Even if I had the
necessary wisdom, time would prevent a complete answer. Each judge strikes his
own balance between the branches of the antimony, and thus achieves his own
solution. But it is essential that we essay some comprehension of the process, for
public understanding is the best bulwark against the strains and criticisms to
which the Court is subjected because of the very nature of its work. And so I
plan to discuss two kinds of limitation upon the judicial function which distinguish the Court from a Council of Wise Men. The necessity for giving them
some weight is only one among many characteristics supporting the distinction, but their influence often explains why the Court renders decisions which
are different from what you or I or Plato's philosopher kings, or even the Justices
themselves, would consider fair, or just, or wise if they were vested with the sum
total of all governmental power.
II
The first limitation is the principle that a Supreme Court decision must take
into account the fundamental distribution of power in our constitutional system
-the division of authority between States and Nation and between the legislative, executive and judicial branches.
STATE AUTONOMY

One division of authority between the State and federal governments is by
subject matter. The national government, for example, is assigned responsibility
for regulating interstate commerce, while the States deal with such local matters
as school, health and building codes. 9 One of the two great constitutional issues
of the past half-century was concerned with the extent of federal authority under
the power to regulate interstate commerce. 10 The issues have critical importance
and are sometimes very hard to decide, but so long as it is concerned solely with
the allocation of functions between the State legislatures and the Congress the
role of the Court is easily determined. The Court-and it alone-must make the
allocation. Conversely it has no concern with the merits of the legislation adopted
by either sovereignty.
The Constitution also divides authority over the same subject matter by limiting what a State may do even within its allocated sphere and then vesting in the
Supreme Court, a branch of the national government, authority to determine
9. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10. See Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 Harv.
L. Rev. 645, 883 (1946).
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whether a limitation has been exceeded. Thus, the States establish public education but the Supreme Court, a branch of the national government, is charged
with deciding whether a State's educational system denies a litigant "equal protection of the law."' 1 The States have general authority to prosecute crimes
against persons and property, but the Court has the responsibility of determining
whether a State has deprived a criminal of life, liberty or property "without due
process of law." 12
In this area almost every case involves two questions: ( 1)what are the merits
or demerits of the rule the State has adopted, (i.e., what should the rule be) ;
and (2) how far may the Supreme Court properly go in restricting a State's
power to adopt whatever rule it chooses. One who asks only the first question in
a given case will often come to a quite different answer from him who also puts
the second; and those who put both questions may assign different degrees of
importance to each.
Perhaps I can clarify these generalizations by specific examples. A few years
ago one Mallory, who was suspected of rape in the District of Columbia, was
arrested and taken to police headquarters about noon. He was held all afternoon
and through the night without being informed either of his right to counsel or
that any statement made by him might be used against him. The detention without arraignment was plainly illegal, for the law requires a federal officer making
an arrest to bring his prisoner before the nearest United States Commissioner for
arraignment without unnecessary delay. After Mallory had been held for nine
hours, he signed a written confession. The confession was admitted in evidence
during the subsequent trial, and on this basis Mallory was convicted and sentenced to death. Upon appeal the Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding
that confession given while the defendant is unlawfully detained without prompt
3
arraignment cannot be used as a basis for a criminal conviction.'
Contrast with the Mallory case the decision a few years earlier in Gallegos v.
Nebraska.4 Gallegos was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to ten years
imprisonment by a Nebraska court. The principal basis for his conviction was
two confessions, one given during a 48-hour period in which he was held incommunicado for interrogation, again without advice concerning his legal rights. The
total period between Gallegos' arrest and arraignment ran to twenty-five days.
When his case was taken to the Supreme Court upon his claim that this procedure had denied the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction by a vote of seven to two.
How can these two decisions be reconciled? One who was oncerned only
with the result-with what is desirable criminal procedure--could not rationally
vote to reverse the Mallory conviction but affirm the conviction of Gallegos.
11.
12.
13.
14.

U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1.
Ibid.
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
342 U.S. 55 (1951).
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Gallegos had been unlawfully held for a very much longer period. The explanation, of course, is that the Supreme Court has a general supervisory authority
over the rules of evidence and conduct of trials in the federal courts; its responsibility is complete and therefore it has a corresponding freedom to adopt the right
rule, subject to the commands of congressional legislation and normal judicial
restraints, including the force of precedent. But this is not true in reviewing
State action. The State was wrong in Gallegos' case in the eyes of all nine
Justices-Mallory shows that-but the phrase "due process of law" in the
Fourteenth Amendment, read in the light of the constitutional division of
authority between State and Nation allows a State to be wrong within limits.
For the Supreme Court to cross over this line in the interests of better criminal
justice would impair the balance of our constitutional system.
But the State is free to do wrong only within limits. The point is illustrated
by Payne v. .4rkansas.1" Payne, a mentally dull Negro, was convicted of first
degree murder and sentenced to death. He too had been arrested without a warrant and not advised of his right to have counsel and to remain silent in the face
of interrogation. He was held without counsel and with very little food. He was
refused permission to make telephone calls, and members of his family who came
to the jail were turned away. After three days the Chief of Police told Payne
that thirty or forty people outside the jail were trying to break in and lynch him.
The Chief could probably save him, the Chief said, if he could tell the people
that Payne had made a confession. In this atmosphere of terror Payne confessed.
The Supreme Court held, seven to two, that the use of this confession violated
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Note that Payne's case differs from Gallegos' only in degree. It was thought
more unfair to use a confession made out of the fear of mob violence by a man
held incommunicado than to use a confession given by one held incommunicado
but without other coercion-enough more unfair to justify intervention when
allowance was made for State autonomy.
Our constitutional law is filled with parallel examples of the weight of State
autonomy. In the federal courts an indigent defendent charged with crime is
entitled to the assistance of counsel assigned by the court ;16 the Supreme Court
decisions do not presently require the States to supply counsel unless the case is
unusually difficult or the crime is capital or the defendant is manifestly unable
to conduct his own defense even with the aid of an impartial judge. 17 Last spring
the Supreme Court reversed an earlier decision and held by a vote of five to four
that a State cannot constitutionally convict a man of crime on the basis of evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure ;18 if the trial had been
15. 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
16. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
17. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).

18. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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held in a federal court the vote would have been unanimous.' Nor is the deference to the State confined to criminal procedure.
Perhaps some of you will ask why so much value should be placed upon State
autonomy. The answer is partly historical. We began our national political life
as a federation of sovereign States which surrendered only a little of their
sovereignty to the national government. The Court could not survive as a court
if it were to sweep the claims of tradition into discard, even if the tradition did
not have a current place in our national consciousness. The answer is partly
practical. We are too big a country and too diverse a people, and we have too
many local customs, for complete national uniformity. Nor should we forget
Justice Brandeis' reminder "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country." 20 The dispersion of power is also a safeguard of freedom.
Perhaps another important part of the answer lies somewhat deeper in our
inherited philosophy. Freedom is precious not merely in its own right; it is
valuable because it carries concomitant personal responsibility for exercising
wisely the power of choice that freedom gives. State autonomy brings the government, and therefore the responsibility for its conduct, closer to the individual.
Of course, there are no standards by which to measure the weight to be given
to the values of State autonomy. I have no doubt that every Justice gives it
weight, perhaps some give it more weight than others. Its affect upon the final
balance must also depend upon how unfair the State's action appears to him who
must pass the final judgment. The reformer ready to remake the world closer to
his heart's desire would inevitably give it less weight than he who was content to
allow time for local self-improvement. Judges are less extreme but each may lean
a little to one temperament or the other.
It also seems likely that the degree of deference owed a State will vary according to subject-matter; the judgment of a State is entitled to less weight in passing
upon a law which curtails the circulation of magazines or books than one which
deals with local economic conditions. Here the question shades into the problem
in constitutional adjudication of making a division of authority between the
Supreme Court and the Congress.
THE COURT AND THE CONGRESS

Legislation.-Thereis no real difficulty in separating the legislative and judicial functions so long as the Supreme Court is called upon only to determine
whether the Congress has stayed within the limited sphere assigned by Article 1.21
The distinction between the legislative and judicial functions becomes very
troublesome, however, when the Court is called upon to decide whether Con19. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
20. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948) ; United States v. Oregon,
366 U.S. 643 (1961).
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gress, although it has exercised a legislative power granted by the Constitution,
has nevertheless violated one of the general restrictions such as the Fifth Amendment's command that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. I can explain the difficulty best by a concrete example.
Suppose that a Congressman, concerned with the cost of building and highway
construction, especially of homebuilding, and also with the number of strikes,
introduced a bill outlawing all strikes in the construction industry and fixing
maximum wages for bricklayers, electricians, carpenters and other mechanics
and laborers. Before voting upon such a bill Congress would have to weigh the
economic needs of the country, the cost of housing, the waste of strikes, the need
for homes and commercial buildings, the adequacy of existing construction wages,
both in terms of purchasing power and in comparison with the wages of other
workers, the value of freedom to contract and of freedom of association in the
pursuit of self-advancement, the risks of interfering with a free market, and a
host of other factors. If the statute, once enacted, were attacked as a violation
of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment, how could the Supreme
Court decide whether the statute was constitutional without asking exactly the
same questions? Yet, if the Court held the law unconstitutional, would it not
be acting as a supra-legislature, instead of a Court, and trespassing in the domain
of Congress?
My example is an old problem clad in modern trappings. If the first great constitutional question of the Twentieth Century concerned the scope of national
power under the commerce clause, the second was whether the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments left Congress and the States power to enact the social and
economic legislation which a majority of the people thought to be required by the
transition from a nation of farmers, artisans and shopkeepers into a modern
industrial and predominantly urban community. When laws were enacted to
provide workmen's compensation, to limit hours of work, establish minimum
wages and abolish child labor, to require payment in cash instead of scrip or to
protect the rights of workers to organize labor unions and bargain collectively,
they were challenged as deprivations of property and of freedom to contract, in
violation of those amendments. For the most part the courts, including the
Supreme Court, sustained the challenge, thus holding that the phrase "due process
of law" not only relates to procedure but also carries substantive protection
22
against legislative regulation.
The resulting constitutional struggle covered almost half a century. The
principal attack upon the judicial decisions was that the Court was passing legislative judgments-that the statutes were held unconstitutional only because the
predilections of the judges led them to appraise quite differently from the legislature the conflicting interests affected by the legislation. In the end this view
22. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) ; Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) ; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (concurring
opinion).
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prevailed to a remarkable degree but its victory set the stage, as I shall show in a
moment, for a new constitutional debate.
The most extreme conclusion was that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
should be held to impose no restrictions upon the kind of legislation which Congress or a State might enact in the field of business activity. Due process, it was
said, relates only to procedure. 23 If the courts undertake to decide whether the
legislature had a sufficient reason for curtailing the rights of property and economic freedom, they will inevitably be passing a legislative judgment, for the
very task of the legislature, as I sought to show by my example, is that of balancing the costs of the restriction against the needs of the community. The
Court's sole task, it was argued, should be to determine whether the Congress
24
was exercising a power delegated to it by the Constitution.
This view has never prevailed in its extreme form but constitutional law has
moved a long way down the road. The current formula, applicable to economic
regulation, is that. . . if the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory,
2
the requirements of due process are satisfied ....
and the judicial power is exhausted. The formula hardly provides a definite
answer to a borderline case but it articulates a definite attitude. In the field of
economic regulation the Court will grant the greatest deference to the legislative
judgment, recognizing that it is for the Congress to evaluate and strike a balance
between conflicting interests. Only when the legislative judgment seems utterly
irrational will the Court interfere.
The adoption of this rule of self-restraint-a rule implicit in the great constitutional divisions of function and therefore akin to the self-imposed deference to
State autonomy-set the stage for a current and unresolved constitutional controversy. Today the great constitutional cases lie in the field of civil liberties.
The crucial question is whether the same degree of restraint which has become
conventional in dealing with social and economic legislation should be exercised
in dealing with restrictions upon personal liberties. And a judge's answer to this
question may have more influence upon the outcome of any given case than his
sympathy or distaste for the legislation which Congress has enacted.
Let me once again try to put the problem concretely. The Smith Act subjects
to criminal prosecution any person who organizes any group or assembly of persons who "teach, advocate or encourage the overthrow" of the government "by
force or violence; or becomes or is a member of" such a group. 26 The wisdom of
this statute as applied to organizations like the Communist Party, is open to
23. United Gas Public Service Co. v. Texas, 303 U.S. 123 (1938)
ring).
24. Cf. Hand, The Bill of Rights (1958).
25. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
26.

18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).

(Black,

J.,

concur-
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debate. The Congress, when it enacted the law in 1940, had to estimate the
degree of danger to the Nation and the imminence of the risk against the costs
of any tendency the law might have to suppress freedom of discussion and political
association. The choice is not an easy one in a nation born of violent revolution
and dedicated to the proposition that freedom for the views we hate offers the
strongest safeguard of liberty and best hope of human progress. When Congress
passed the Smith Act and the front-line Communists were convicted of violation,
its constitutionality was attacked upon the ground that the statute violated the
command of the First Amendment that Congress "shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. ..,,7 How could the Supreme Court
answer the constitutional question without balancing the same competing interests that Congress had already evaluated ?And if the Court made its own evaluation, would it not be repeating the mistake of the old Court in dealing with
economic legislation?
Consider one other example. The Communist Control Act forbids the State
Department to issue a passport to any member of the Communist Party.28 There
are some party members who have passports, and the Department has recently
called for their surrender. Suppose that a Communist refused to surrender his
1passport and sought to travel upon it to a foreign country. When stopped he
might take the resulting case to the Supreme Court contending that freedom of
travel is part of the liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. How could the
Court pass judgment upon the constitutionality of the statute without balancing
the interest in freedom to travel at will against the danger that spies, saboteurs
and Communist trouble-makers would use United States passports on missions endangering our national security? If the Court made such an inquiry, would it
not be going over the ground covered by Congress before it enacted the statute
and thus exercising not a judicial but a legislative function? If so, should it not
defer to a reasonable congressional judgment?
In both cases, and in others like them, it would be hard to deny that the
Supreme Court was reviewing the same ground that Congress could, and perhaps
should, have covered; but it is entirely possible that the role of the Court in passing judgment upon the constitutionality of alleged violations of personal liberty
is altogether different from its function in reviewing economic legislation.
One ground of difference that has been strenuously pressed upon the Court,
although it has not yet commanded the assent of a majority, is that the commands
of the Constitution securing personal liberty are so absolute that no balancing of
the interests is required and therefore there is no occasion for loading the scales
with deference to Congress; the only question is whether Congress has imposed
a restriction that the Bill of Rights prohibits. The First Amendment, it is pointed
out, provides that Congress shall enact "no law respecting the establishment of
"religion;" "no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;" and
27. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
28. 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1952).
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"no law... abridging ...the right of the people peaceably to assemble.... ." And
if Congress has enacted any such law, according to this view, the Court has a duty
to invalidate it whenever the issue arises in a justiciable controversy. Mr. Justice
Black has stated the reasoning with great persuasion:
I do not agree that laws directly abridging First Amendment freedoms
can be justified by a congressional or judicial balancing process ...
To apply the Court's balancing test under such circumstances [to repression of beliefs, not action-to reprisals for ideas and associations,
not conduct] is to read the First Amendment to say, "Congress shall
pass no law abridging freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition,
unless Congress and the Supreme Court reach the joint conclusion
that on balance the interest of the Government in stifling these freedoms is greater than the interest of the people in having them
exercised." This is closely akin to the notion that neither the First
Amendment nor any other provision of the Bill of Rights should be
29
enforced unless the Court believes that it is reasonableto do so.
There are others who have difficulty with this approach. They argue that even
the guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press is not absolute. In Justice
Holmes' famous phrase, one has no constitutional right to cry fire in a crowded
theater, 30 and other restrictions can be imposed to preserve the public peace and
order.31 It may be said too that whatever support this view finds in the absolute
words of the First Amendment in dealing with freedom of religion, of expression
and of assembly, there is no mention of other aspects of personal liberty such as
freedom of political association and freedom of travel; their protection depends
upon the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Yet these answers-if they are answers-are not the end of the argument.
Most of the community, I believe, values personal liberties more highly than
property or economic freedom, and surely this carries some higher degree of constitutional-which means judicial-protection. Mr. Justce Stone suggested that
"legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to
more exacting judicial scrutiny." 3 2 Freedom of speech, of the press and of political activity is essential to the existence of democratic self-government. Upon its
exercise depends the integrity of the legislative process. These personal liberties,
it may be urged, are therefore entitled to a higher place in the constitutional hierarchy and any restriction requires greater justification.
Even this reasoning does not altogether avoid the underlying problem. If the
Court is to engage in any balancing, must it not place in the scales in favor of
29. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141-43 (1959)

(dissenting opinion).

30. Shenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
31. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) ; Kovacs v. Cooper,

336 U.S. 77 (1949) ; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
32. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
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constitutionality some degree of deference to the Congressional judgment?
Whether it should give any weight, and if so, how much weight it should give,
can be answered only by achieving a consensus upon this aspect of the constitutional division of power between the legislative and judicial functions. None
exists today. In searching for it some germ of truth may perchance be found in an
inquiry as to whether the legislative process functions as effectively when personal
liberties are at stake as when it is adjusting conflicting economic interests. Even if
some balancing be inevitable the high value of these liberties leaves less room for
legislative adjustment; and by the very nature of the case dissenters whose views
are liable to suppression and for whose protection the Bill of Rights was intended
are so small and unpopular a number that their weight will not be felt in an
elected chamber. I wonder, too, whether experience has not led the American
people, rightly or wrongly, to rely upon the Court and not the legislatures for the
protection of individual freedom and the right of dissent. If this be the people's
instinct, perhaps a judge should guide himself accordingly, even though his own
political philosophy might call for greater reliance upon the political process.
I do not mean to suggest an answer-indeed I have none-but I invite your
attention to the problem and its impact upon the processes of constitutional
adjudication.
CongressionalInvestigations.-The power of Congress to conduct investiga-

tions in aid of the legislative process is beyond dispute.aa Investigations supply
Congress with information indispensable to intelligent legislation. They focus
public attention upon evils for which a legislative remedy may be needed. For
example, the hearings of the McClellan Committee into improper practices in
the field of labor management relations uncovered facts which were not theretofore known either to Congress or to expert students of the field; there was no
other way in which the information necessary to legislation could have been
developed.
Nonetheless there have been grave misgivings about the conduct of some
Congressional investigations. It is said that we are developing new forms of
prosecution for unpopular conduct-legislative trials in which Senators or Congressmen prosecute and then enter a judgment of conviction. The ensuing punishment by holding up to public obloquy is not unlike the pillory of Puritan New
England. The procedure of some committees has been questioned; for example,
one of the Justices asked counsel during the argument of a case involving an
alleged contempt of Congress, whether counsel thought it was "fair" for a congressional committee to pull a man off the street under current conditions and,
without any information about him, ask whether he is a member of the Communist Party, whether he does not know prominent Communists, etc.3 4 Furthermore, many observers believe that there can be little doubt about the tendency
33. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135,160-75 (1927).
34. The example was purely hypothetical although it was argued by opposing counsel that this was in principle what had happened in the case at bar.
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of hearings by the Un-American Activities Committee and the Senate Internal
Security Committee to discourage freedom of thought, association and expression.
During the last two or three years numerous cases have come before the
Supreme Court on appeal from judgments convicting the petitioners of contempt
of Congress for refusing to answer questions and sentencing them to short terms
of imprisonment.8 5 In each instance the Court is asked to hold that the conduct
of the investigation violated the Bill of Rights because of one or more of the
shortcomings just mentioned. The cases raise in another form the Court's central problem of defining its own function in relation to other branches of government. How far is the conduct of investigations the responsibility of the Supreme
Court? How far are Congressional investigations solely the responsibility of
Congress ?
According to one view the only function of the Court is to see that Congress
has stayed within its constitutional field of action. The Court should ask whether
the question which the witness refused to answer was relevant to some subject
into which the congressional committee was authorized by Congress to inquire
and whether the inquiry pertained to some subject upon which Congress was
authorized by the Constitution to legislate. 30 Under this view the witness is
entitled to have the pertinency of the question explained to him8 and of course
his specific rights such as his privilege against self-incrimination must be respected.38 But here the judicial function would terminate. Judicial restraint is
essential in dealing with so vital an element of the legislative process. It is not
for the Court to tell a coordinate and equal branch of the government how to
conduct its business.
This view may be the wiser, but note that there is no logical compulsion in
the words of the Constitution which prevents the Court from going farther and
reasoning that when Congress comes to the judiciary and asks the judiciary to
use its power to punish as a way of supporting the investigative powers of Congress, then the courts are entitled to ascertain independently whether Congress
is asking them to support it in what is in reality a legislative trial rather than a
true inquiry. If the Congress wishes to avoid this degree of judicial scrutiny, let
it rely upon its own powers to punish for contempt of Congress.39
Perhaps I state both views in more extreme fashion than anyone would accept,
but since the issue is involved in current cases it would be unseemly to comment
further. Probably the Court always inquires somewhat into the merits of the
35. E.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) ; Braden v. United States,
365 U.S. 431 (1961) ; Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
36. See Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 407-13 (1961).

37. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
38. See, e.g., Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).

39. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 206-08 (1957), and the concurring
opinion of Justice Frankfurter at 216-17. There would, of course, remain the question to
what extent the same issues could be raised in a federal court on collateral attack. Cf.
Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935).
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balance which Congress has struck between the needs of an investigation and
the rights of the individual, but its judicial task is not complete until it also
asks how far our constitutional system commits the responsibility, and therefore
the choice, to Congress. And such divisions as arise between the Justices will often
turn upon differences, not in their views concerning the wisdom or fairness of
the investigation, but in their conception of the nature of the Court's constitutional functions.
III

In emphasizing the role of the division of power between States and Nation,
and between the legislative and judicial branches, in distinguishing the Supreme
Court from an omnipotent Council of Wise Men we should not minimize other
equally important differences. The list is too long to canvass but, as illustrations,
I may dwell for a moment upon two precepts inherent in our historic conception
of the judicial power. The Supreme Court is a court. There are some things
which a court may properly do. It may not do others.
Case or Controversy.-The federal courts, including the Supreme Court, sit
to decide cases and controversies 4 0 -disputes in which something material is at
stake between the rival litigants. They do not decide abstract issues or give
advisory opinions. A much debated example is the decision last term in Poe v.
Ullman,4 1 the Connecticut birth control case. Connecticut has a statute which
provides that any person using contraceptives shall be fined not less than $50.00
or imprisoned for not more than a year. Two separate actions were brought in
the State courts asking for a decision as to whether the statute could constitutionally be applied to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs in one action were a couple
who had given birth to three congenitally abnormal and short-lived children and
a housewife whose life would be seriously endangered by pregnancy. These
plaintiffs claimed that their need of advice on methods of contraception and their
right to use contraceptives were seriously impaired by the Connecticut law. In
the other action, a Dr. Buxton objected that the State statute deprived him of
the liberty to practice his profession as he saw fit.
It is not always necessary to violate a statute in order to obtain Supreme Court
review of the constitutionality of the statute. There are a number of cases in
which a person merely threatened with criminal prosecution if he followed a
proposed course of conduct has been able to obtain a Supreme Court decision on
the constitutionality of punishing him for the proposed conduct. 42 But in each

of these the risk of prosecution was far more immediate than for the Connecticut
plantiffs. The Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute had been on the books for
over seventy-five years, and there was only on recorded prosecution-a prosecution of a birth control clinic twenty years ago. Not only was there no record of
40. U.S. Const., art. III, § 2.
41. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
42. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961) ; Euclid
v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
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any prosecution of mere users of contraceptives or of doctors who had advised
their private patients, but it was admitted by both counsel that contraceptives
were freely sold in drug stores throughout the State.
With these facts before it the Supreme Court refused to exercise its admitted
power to pass upon the constitutionality of the Connecticut statute. In the view
of the majority, the Connecticut anti-contraceptive law simply had no such
immediate and substantial effect on any of these plaintiffs as to justify the
Supreme Court in passing on its constitutionality. The plurality opinion of Justice Frankfurter stated that "eighty years of Connecticut history demonstrate a
..tacit agreement" not to prosecute and that "to find it necessary to pass on
these statutes now, in order to protect appellants from the hazards of prosecution,
would be to close our eyes to reality." Realistically, none of the plaintiffs had any
basis for a fear of prosecution if they did the acts they proposed. And neither the
effects of an unrealistic fear nor the plaintiffs' desire to obey a State law until
it was held unconstitutional would, the Court held, justify it in passing on the
validity of the statute.
One may ask whether it would not be better to have had a constitutional decision upon the constitutionality of the Connecticut birth control law even in
these contrived cases, so that the people of Connecticut would know where they
stood' Similarly, an argument can be made that the country would be helped by
an advisory Supreme Court decision upon whether federal aid to parochial
schools would violate the First Amendment's declaration that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion." The highest courts of a
number of States are authorized to give advisory opinions upon the meaning of
the State constitutions.
The rule carries its costs. Like other rules its application to particular circumstances such as the Connecticut birth control case is also open to debate. But
restraint in the exercise of the enormous power to invalidate an act of the representatives elected by the people is one of the attributes of a judicial decision-it is
essential, I suspect, to the preservation of the Court's place in our constitutional
system. The Court's role is controversial enough; we could hardly tolerate a
roving commission to strike down any act of any governmental body or official
which, abstractly viewed, might be thought to violate someone's constitutional
right under some circumstances. The only justification for the doctrine of judicial
review is that the courts must decide the cases which come before them according
to law. If the plaintiff, in seeking property or damages from the defendant, bases
his claim upon a statute and the defendant replies that the application of the
statute under these circumstances would deprive him of a right guaranteed by
the Constitution, the Court is forced to decide a constitutional question in order
to resolve the claim in litigation. But if no concrete case is pending involving the
constitutional rights of a litigant whose situation will be substantially affected by
the ruling, a decent respect for coordinate branches of government requires the
judiciary to stay its hand.
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This kind of restraint also affects the quality of decisions. No one can know in
advance exactly what the issues will be; no one can cover all the contingencies.
A trial brings out the facts with a clarity and completeness quite impossible in
giving an abstract opinion. More important, perhaps, is that giving advisory
opinions or deciding moot cases would entangle the Court in political processes.
The timing of an opinion, the points covered or omitted, the language and emphasis, all would tend to become parts of the process by which law was made. The
processes would become more political and less judicial. We should have more
judicial law-making and less judgment according to law.
Political Questions.-The most important case now pending before the
Supreme Court raises the question of how far the Court should seek to preserve
its judicial character by refusing to decide what might be denominated a "political question" even though the question is presented in the context of actual litigation. Before the Civil War the Court had declined to rule which of two competing claimants was the lawful government of Rhode Island. 43 On later occasions
it refused to consider the claims of litigants that a State had violated the consti44
tutional guarantees of a "republican form of government."
The present case involves the apportionment of representatives in the Tennessee legislature. The State constitution provides that seats in both the House of
Representatives and the Senate shall be apportioned among districts in direct
ratio to population. The State constitution also directs the legislature to make a
new apportionment every ten years. Despite this command the Tennessee legislature has made no reapportionment since 1901, and a majority made up of
representatives from the sparsely populated districts has consistently defeated
reapportionment bills. The result is that the representatives from some districts
represent ten and even twenty times as many people as the representatives from
others; put another way, the votes of some citizens count ten or twenty times as
much as others. After efforts to obtain relief in the State courts proved fruitless,
the plaintiff brought suit in a federal court seeking a declaration that the malapportionment was so gross as to deny the under-represented Tennessee voters
equal protection of the law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
lower court held that the federal courts have no power to consider this kind of
constitutional controversy. The question is now pending before the Supreme
45

Court on Appeal.

Essentially the same situation could be duplicated in NewYork, Indiana, Oklahoma and any number of other States. If the courts have jurisdiction to enforce
a reasonable degree of equality in representation in the State legislatures, the
decision will change our political history.
The pending case is a fascinating example of the distinction between a court
and a Council of Wise Men. No one would defend the merits of the Tennessee
43. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1894).
44. See, e.g., Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223, U.S. 118 (1912).
45. Baker v. Carr, No. 6, October Term, 1961.
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malapportionment or similar inequities in other States either as a matter of
abstract justice or sound government., The State legislatures have in very large
part failed to adapt themselves to modern problems and majority needs, especially to the burgeoning problems of urban and metropolitan regions. This failure
has resulted in public cynicism, disillusionment and loss of confidence. A primary
reason is that in many States the majority of the people, even large majorities, do
not control the legislature. There is a growing tendency to bypass the States
because of the lack of understanding in governments elected by rural minorities,
and to turn to the national government. Reapportionment would in fact be one
of the best methods of encouraging vigorous and responsible State and local
government. A Council of Wise Men would unquestionably blot out the present
evil.
The Court cannot carry the whole burden of government. There are wrongs,
and perhaps reapportionment is one, which can be righted only by executive
or legislative action or by the people exercising political rights. Since the Constitution does not require exact numerical equality there would be grave difficulty
in establishing standards by which the Court could determine what is a fair
apportionment; perhaps legislative representation is an area which, in the words
of one commentator, is better left "unprincipled on principle" because "the job
is better done without rules."' 46 There is also doubt about the feasibility of judicial relief ; assuming the plaintiffs are correct, it is said, a court cannot lay out new
legislative districts or issue process to compel a legislature to legislate the districts
according to judicial rules. Furthermore, a court should not embroil itself in the
politics of elections, and nothing in our history has been more peculiarly political
than the laying out of representative districts. The Court could seriously impair
its own effectiveness by assuming purely political functions that ought to have
been performed by others.
In response, it was argued that relief could be obtained only through the
courts because one vice of existing malapportionments is that they prevent the
majority of the people from successfully invoking the legislative process to secure
a new apportionment. Various forms of judicial relief were suggested. But the
main thrust of the argument was that the force of a Supreme Court decision is
greater than the formal reach of judicial process. A decision holding the issue
justiciable would help to open the doors of State tribunals upon which the primary burden should fall in dealing with controversies of State apportionmenta burden to be carried partly in terms of State constitutional law. A decision
denying jurisdiction would help to close the doors, for even when the Court
purports merely to stand aside, its opinion allowing the challenged measure to
stand, because of the Court's prestige and the spell it casts as a symbol, tends
"to entrench and solidify measures that may have been tentative in the conception
46. Bickel, The Passive Virtues: The Supreme Court 1960 Term, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
40,76 (1961).
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or that are on the verge of abandonment in the execution. 47 Conversely, the
power of the principle of legitimacy and the moral force of a decision by the
Supreme Court focusing attention upon an indispensable condition of a free
society would extend the influence of the decision beyond the scope of a judicial
decree into the realms of legislative and political action. Granting the need for
judicial self-restraint on appropriate occasion, it was said, judicial inaction
through excessive caution or a fancied impotence in the face of admitted wrong
might do our governmental system, including the judicial branch, still greater
damage.
It is not for me to say where the balance lies. The Tennessee Reapportionment
Case epitomizes one aspect of the dilemma. The Court's constitutional authority
depends upon its self-restraint, but excessive restraint, while it conserves the
Court's power, would deny its usefulness. That the dilemma should have been
solved so successfully for 170 years is testimony not only to the soundness of the
institution but to the courage, wisdom and intellectual integrity of the Justices
who have shaped its history, including those who now sit upon the Court.
47. Bickel, The Passive Virtues: The Supreme Court 1960 Term, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
40, 48 (1961).

